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Abstract
The Cold War International system which polarized 
Europe and other world continents into two hostile 
camps: the West dominated by the United States 
and the East by the Soviet Union after 1945 had 
profound implications on African security, stability and 
independence. As response to Cold War diplomacy, 
Africa and other emergent states in the international 
system formulated the non-aligned movement as a way 
out of the ideological posturing of superpowers. Poverty 
and ideological deficiency undermined the non-aligned 
movement which states flirted between the two camps 
with dangerous consequences to the stability of their 
nation-states. African states which pursued independent 
paths to modernity and prosperity were either denied, 
neglected or destabilized; while others compromised their 
independence, collaborated with the forces of imperialism 
and became arrowheads in the hands of capitalist 
predators. This paper attempts an overview of the bi-
polar world system and its implications for United States 
policy towards Africa between 1945 and 1990. Inter-alia, 
the paper posits that the continued chase for a place in 
the orbit of occidentalism from idealist viewpoint rather 
reinforces dependency than reconcile the contradictions 
of underdevelopment. The paper also decries the 
ideological deficiency and reechoes the call for African 
development to be anchored on an ideological beacon as 
a sure way of giving succor to its independence.  
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INTRODUCTION
It is often said that a fool at forty is a fool forever; 
Africa is well over fifty and still yawning from colonial 
memorabilia, leadership inertia, and followership amnesia. 
These seeming pathological complications which have 
affected all the components of state structure have 
produced results antithetical to development. It could no 
longer be convincing 50 years after, to attribute Africa’s 
manifest problems to European colonialism as Walter 
Rodney (1974), thesis postulates. In line with a paradigm 
shift in interpretation, Igwe (2010), has noted glaring 
evidences of Africa’s backwardness in global politics in 
his titled thesis How Africa underdeveloped Africa.
Cut  th roa t  compe t i t ion  fo r  the  con t ro l  and 
appropriation of national resources by geo-ethnic groups, 
massive corruption and lootocracy accompanying high 
political offices as in Nigeria, external manipulation of 
international economic relations for strategic and energy 
needs to mention a few, have contributed immensely to 
becloud the focus of state machinery. More worrisome 
is the mistaken assumption that socio-economic and 
political salvation can come from outside Africa, even 
when farsighted traditional and some modern African elite 
sounded a note of caution from the rays of Occidentalism 
for obvious predatory implications. These warnings by 
the doyens of African nationalism seem to have fallen 
on deaf ears of today’s political leaders who mistake 
globalization and capitalist manifestation for development 
and modernity. It has become fashionable for the ruling 
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class in Africa to ally with the forces of imperialism and 
neocolonialism in the guise of technical assistance, advice 
and collaboration. Service delivery has long ceased to be 
a yardstick for measuring achievement. Rather, a foreign 
trip to the world’s capitals’ to solicit support for tenure 
elongation in office has become the cornerstone of our 
democratic experiment. These worrisome developments 
have really questioned the sincerity of African nationalism 
and independence. This paper shall consider the 
importance of ideology in nation building, the bi-polar 
international system and Africa’s responses and the 
implications of the bi-polar system on US-Africa policy to 
1990, then conclusion.
1.  THE SEARCH FOR IDEOLOGY AND 
THE NEXUS BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND 
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
After the fashion of Ulysses the ancient mariner, “it is 
never too late to seek a newer world,” so also is the call 
for an ideological beacon to anchor socio-economic and 
political development of Africa not new and still very 
crucial in the search for Africa’s “liberation” 50 or more 
years after Africa’s independence. In a speech to the 
Cuban people on the occasion of the seventh anniversary 
of the Cuban revolution, Amilcar Cabral decried thus:
the ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, 
within the national liberation movements- which is basically 
due to ignorance of the historical reality which these movements 
claim to transform-constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of 
our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness of 
all. (Cabral, 1966)
In a similar vein, Frantz Fanon asserted thus: 
The deeper I enter into the cultures and the political circles the 
surer I am that the greater danger that threatens Africa is the 
absence of ideology.
In Ideology and National Consciousness Patrick F. 
Wilinot (1980) noted:
When the need for an ideology is expressed they [political 
leaders], immediately wave the red-herring of the foreignness 
of any ideology opposed to their own personal, individual 
interests, forgetting that while they have no ideology of their 
own, their action is still structured by ideologies formulated in 
New York, Paris, London, Bonn, and that the interests they serve 
tantamount to treason against the nation.
Wilmot defines ideology as a system of ideas which 
generates and sustains action. Accordingly, it is a 
function of ideology to define interest, to establish their 
order and priority, to create structures of action which 
seeks to enhance and defend those interests (Wilmot, 
1980, p.3). 
I may add that “ignorance of the historical reality” 
of national independence constitutes one of the greatest 
dangers in our march to nationhood.
Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah, the vociferous anti-
imperialist and one time Prime Minister of Ghana in West 
Africa, is often quoted as saying “seek ye first the political 
kingdom, and all other things shall be added unto it”; this 
‘oft-quote’, to say the least, explains the momentous and 
enthusiastic frenzy with which African nationalist attached 
to political independence. Unknown to Nkrumah and his 
African compatriots, political independence felt short 
of expectations once it was divorced from the economic 
sub-structure which had been organically integrated into 
the orbit of western capital. With the economic levers 
of progress in the hands of former colonial masters and 
their local agents, African independence bent backwards 
to the colonizers for technical and economic assistance, 
for modernization policies, development strategies and 
so on. Some statesmen even collaborated with the forces 
of imperialism to remain in the pinnacle of power at the 
expenses of popular will. Little or nothing was done to 
dismantle those structures of oppression which became a 
“conundrum to the post-colonial countries.”
Collaboration with forces inimical to African 
independence is a negative historical trend which 
originated with imperialism and colonialism. It is recalled 
that during the invasion of the African continent by white 
predators in the 19th century, African potentates devised 
varying modus-vivendi to contain the punitive and 
rude diplomatic manoveuring of the colonizing powers. 
Whereas some put up fierce resistance to defend their 
territories and independence, others perceived the futility 
in resistance and diplomatically collaborated with the 
invading powers to maintain their hold on the throne and 
conduct trade which was fast changing hands. From Cape 
to Cario, African potentates in the 19th century were not 
passive onlookers during the violation of their territorial 
integrity by foreign powers. In what is remembered in the 
literature as “primary resistance”, African chiefs defended 
their independence with all the available arsenals in their 
armory until force of circumstance worked against their 
efforts. It is in this vein that one can speak of Samori 
Toure as the “Bonaparte of the Sudan”, (West Africa), 
the mau-mau rebellion in East Africa (Kenya) the Muktar 
rebellion in North Africa (Libya) and the Zulu and 
Hottentot wars in the Southern African enclave. In West 
Africa, Michael Crowder’s edited work on resistance is 
illustrative.
It is rather unfortunate that in the rich pool of historical 
knowledge, we have either learnt nothing and forgotten 
nothing or leaders draw only the negative, which is 
why collaboration with the forces of neocolonialism 
is not only a contradiction of African independence 
but questions the very essence of African nationalism. 
Ideological deficiency or lack of it underscores the many 
administrative and foreign policy blunders of many 
regimes in Africa. Wilmot’s observation made many years 
back is still relevant in our march to nationhood:
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… today, we observe the spectacle of statesmen, political 
leaders who, through design or accident, find themselves at 
the helm of the affairs of state not only confessing that they 
have no ideology—men without the slightest conception of 
nationhood—formulate national development plans, speak 
of the national interest and demand from the innocent school 
children loyalty to a nation whose flame they daily suppress 
through collaboration with forces inimical to national 
existence.
Indeed, it is only in Africa that a national interest 
exists without a national ideology. It is the absences of 
a national ideology that could lead a head of state who 
swore to maintain the territorial integrity of his Nation-
state cede away the same to another country in the guise 
of observing international law. The other day, Abduloye 
Wade, the Senegalese president speaking on the prospects 
of NEPAD commented thus:
…the problem is not to take all this (sic) and bring to the G8 
and say, please you finance this—my view is to ask G8 to help 
Africa to create the conditions that allow us to attract capital— 
(Bukarambe, 2004, p.31)
NEPAD is the latest comer in Africa’s development 
trajectory widely acclaimed to be an African own initiative 
that should resolve all the contradictions associated with 
under-development and backwardness. Unfortunately, 
since 2001 till date NEPAD is still “in the Nigerian Dock” 
(NIIA, 2004)1. If Africa has to invite world powers of 
the G-8 club to help create the conditions that “allow 
us to attract capital”, as clarified by Mr. President, the 
implications are obvious. The invitation is a signal to the 
loss of African independence and or a call to entrench 
neocolonialism and further dependency. For obvious 
reasons, the dynamics of international economic relations 
respond favorably to capital and capitalist interest and not 
in the interest of peripheral economies that were originally 
meant to feed the capital. Secondly, the industrialized 
economies of the G-8 Club are not insulated from the 
vagaries of international economic system which they 
have to guide against or protect. These facts remain be 
clouded to African leaders who continue to assume that 
the international economy would be out of sympathy work 
in its favor.
France’s military presence in the West African state 
of Mali, 50 years after, and parades as the power which 
possesses the material and psychological pre-requisite 
for conflict management, resolution and control is a 
mockery. If it is in this sense that Wade was talking 
about helping Africa to create a favorable climate 
for ‘capital’, then the invasion and re-colonization of 
Africa is not far- fetched, after all, international laws 
are made, interpreted and repudiated by the same forces 
of international capital to protect their interests in the 
international arena. The lessons of Congo, Somalia, 
1 NEPAD in the Nigerian Dock. (2004). Proceedings of a 
Conference organized by the Nigerian Institute of Int’l Affairs (NIIA) 
in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert foundation. 
Angola, Libya and neighbouring Iraq are harsh and fresh 
and reiterate the inevitability and imminence of an African 
ideology, if we must arrest the drift, remain united and 
stronger in an international environment which elevates 
power and profit to the detriment of humanity.
African states pretended to respond to the call for 
ideology in nation building by resorting to “defensive 
radicalism”, as an ideological ploy. As postulated by 
Claude (1978), “defensive radicalism”, is an attempt at 
mystification; the assumption of a radical posture and the 
use of this posture as a cover for containing revolutionary 
pressures and for maintaining the status quo.” Only a 
few African states which attempted to tread the path of 
socialism could be vindicated from these ideological 
pretensions. The reality however is that we can no longer 
afford to grope in the dark, ideological inevitability 
cannot be over emphasized. The United States and other 
industrialized nations appreciate the role of ideology 
in nation building and continue to use the same with 
maximum results. If Africa has an interest or recognizes it 
has, it is the function of ideology to create the structures 
of action which should seek to enhance and defend those 
interests. As aptly summarized by Barrack Obama (2004), 
“Africa’s future is up to Africans”.  
2.  THE BI-POLAR INTERNATIONAL 
S Y S T E M  A N D  T H E  N O N - A L I G N 
MOVEMENT 
Bi-polar ism,  is  a  term which has  been used to 
characterize the state of diametric opposition by the two 
super powers after the second world war (1939—1945). 
The cold war, as this era was called from 1947, refers 
to the period of the prevalence of the psychological or 
ideological opposition between the dominant blocs in the 
world. The two dominant blocs then were the Western 
(capitalist) bloc under the leadership of the US and the 
Eastern (socialist) bloc, the former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republic, (USSR), under the hegemony of 
Russia.
The cold war is usually referred to as psychological 
warfare because it was fought without the conventional 
weapons of warfare and characterized by bi-polarism 
with each side working assiduously to gain spheres of 
influence and deterrence. Each super power attempted 
to achieve military superiority in the area of nuclear 
armament which, as noted by Asogwa (1999), was the 
most dreaded weapon then. The balance of power which 
resulted from the rivalries and competition produced 
a balance of terror which saved the world from a 
Third World war. During the era, US president, Harry 
S. Truman formulated the Truman’s doctrine and the 
Marshall plan as packages to assist Greece and Turkey 
and help any other country that was threatened by 
communism. He asserted that:
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at the present moment in world history nearly every nation 
must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is 
too often not a free one. One way of life is based on the will 
of the majority [democracy]…. the second way of life is based 
upon the will of a minority [totalitarianism]…, I believe that it 
must be policy of the United States to support free peoples who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressures…(Higgins, 1984, pp.43-44)
 Truman’s declaration was a definition of American 
foreign policy which was to last up to the 1980s. 
This rather global policy which came to be known as 
“containment”, principally guided US foreign policy 
behavior in Europe and beyond with severe implication 
for its African policy which is examined in the subsequent 
segment. Haven sworn to crush communism everywhere 
in the world, and noting that “the choice is too often not 
a free one” independent nation-states across the continent 
polarized into the two rival blocs as a matter of course. 
As subject people still under the colonial umbrella of 
their metropolitan countries, Africa and other Third World 
nations, like the proverbial tortoise, tactically opted for 
neutrality as the best approach to the cold war. By 1947 
when the cold war intensified very few African countries 
were independent. They include Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia 
and South Africa. The choice of neutrality from cold 
war diplomatic entanglement could well be captured 
dramatically by a very courageous  statement by General 
Murtala Mohammed some years later as follows:
The time has come when we should make it clear that we can 
decide for ourselves, that we know our own interests and how to 
protect those interests; that we are capable of resolving African 
problems without presumptuous lessons in ideological dangers 
which more often than not, have no relevance for us nor for the 
problems at hand. (cited in Wilmot, 1989, p.8)
That the above remarks made by an African head of 
state (Nigerian), about 20 years after Truman’s declaration 
should have earned the head of state’s dear life in a 
bloody coup d’tat testify eloquently to US commitment 
to “the choice is too often not a free one.” The non-
align movement, a diplomatic contraption of Third world 
nations of mostly Afro-Asian composition with India, 
Egypt, and Yugoslavia among the founding members, was 
intended by these nation-states to follow an independent 
policy in foreign affairs, not getting involved in the 
mutually suspicious and hostile politico military pursuit 
of the super powers. To be neutral but not passive was 
intended to ensure impartiality in judgement, actions 
and policies and to take decisions not influenced by cold 
war protagonists. Maintaining equidistance between the 
East and the West was also, a means of protecting the 
independence and sovereignty of the newly independent 
states of Africa and Asia.
Ojo and Sesay (2002) capture Kwame Nkumah’s 
views on non-alignments thus:
It is not a policy of indifference, it is a policy of positive action 
in international affairs particularly with regard to avoid peace 
and cooperation. Powers which pursues policies of goodwill and 
cooperation and constructive international action will always 
find us by their side. (Ojo & Sesay, 2002, p.148)
The basis for non-alignment as a major foreign policy 
plank as noted by Ojo and Sasey include:
(i)  To get economic and technical assistance which 
cannot be achieved if the Afro-Asian counties 
openly sided with either of the super powers. 
Developing equidistance with respect to the East 
and the West would help them approach either of 
the two powers and their allies for badly needed 
assistance to meet the overwhelming task of 
nation building.  
(ii)  Having  emerged  f rom the  excruc ia t ing 
expe r i ences  o f  co lon ia l i sm,  the  newly 
independent states needed a tranquil world 
system which would enable them to resolve their 
daunting economic, social and political issues. 
Assistance and cooperation from both blocs 
could only be secured by non-commitment to 
their quarrels.
(iii)  The new states believed that with the cold war 
scenario, neutrality would contribute immensely 
to world peace and security by mediating 
between the super powers.
(iv)  Lastly, the Afro-Asian countries hoped to narrow 
the areas of conflict in the international system 
considering the intensive recruitment drive which 
both super powers embarked upon during the 
period. Basking in the above premise, the non-
aligned states endeavored to befriend both super 
powers, visiting Washington, Moscow, Peking 
and opening up embassies. In that regard, non-
alignment as asserted by Ojo and Sasay, had no 
permanent friends in the international system, 
only a permanent interest, the preservation of 
world peace and security.
If the Afro-Asian states assumed that neutrality in the 
cold war imbroglio was a smart diplomatic manoeuvring, 
they were mistaken; for as John Forster Dulles, the US 
secretary of state asserted; “non-alignment was immoral 
because it did not side with the US”. (Ojo & Sasay, 
2002, p.151) The implication of the above assertion and 
the dilemma of the colonial situation will constitute the 
subject of the last segment.
3.  BI-POLARISM AND ITS IMPLICATION 
FOR US AFRICA POLICY 1945-1990
Bi-polarism and the policy of ‘containment’ enunciated 
had by the US had far reaching implications for the 
security and stability of African states. Containment not 
only “completely subordinated most African and Asian 
issues to the success of the plan for European recovery 
and rearmament” (Kolko, 1988), it tested and ridiculed 
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the legitimacy and reality of African independence. US 
role as a major player in European reconstruction, and the 
ensuring cold war with the USSR gave vent to irrational 
foreign policy decisions against African states and the 
Third world at large.
American involvement in Africa from the 1950s was 
facilitated by the gradual disengagement of the colonial 
powers who have been opposed to any active involvement 
of a foreign power in their sphere of influence. The Anglo-
American relationship traceable to the John Jay treaty of 
1794, the Consular Convention signed between the United 
Kingdom and the US in 1951, and Britain’s waning power 
over empire during the era of decolonization, all served 
as green light for the US to proceed with her increased 
political contacts with Africa. (Enor, 2012) The US 
cultural exchange program of the state department in the 
1950s was also remarkable for strengthening US-Africa 
relations; it also exposed African leaders to the many 
areas of similarities and cooperation.
To Africa, the US meant many things; an inspiring 
example of a successful multiethnic federation, a big 
brother and pally to look up to in times of strain and 
stress; the US was not only a voice in the international 
arena, it was a founding member of the United Nations, 
and the North Atlantic treaty organization (NATO). 
Haven staged the first successful anti-colonial war of 
independence, Africa relied on the US to meaningfully 
utilize its potentials to assist it wards off the yoke of 
colonialism and the evolution of most colonial territories 
into nation-hood. This hope was made more germane by 
the historical fact that America did not have any direct 
colonial role in Africa, and twice in the 20th century, it 
has been involved in world wars to make the world safe 
for democracy. As a founding member of the UN, the 
US participated in the formulation of the organizations 
policies on decolonization. When in 1945, Prime Minister 
Wilson Churchill was quoted as saying he would not 
preside over the liquidation of British Empire, the US 
impressed upon the principle of self-determination of 
subject people which was first propagated during the 
peace of Versailles in 1919, and demanded that Britain 
recognized the independence of colonial subjects. African 
leaders could not be oblivious to the specific and general 
roles of the US and other world powers within the UN on 
the colonial question. 
This seeming paternalistic posturing of US soon 
assumed a new turn in the cold war years, when it wavered 
between containing expansionist communism and the 
essentially European focused view of world economic 
reconstruction. As Gabriel (1988) noted, anti-communism 
defined the practical foundation of US-African policy. 
The US lost to the USSR her enviable reputation as 
an anti-imperial champion especially as the issue of 
decolonization became one of the arsenals of cold war 
rivalry between the super powers. Developing countries, 
who hitherto received enormous economic and technical 
assistance from the US, isolated her in preference of 
Soviet anti-colonial posture. The USSR did not hesitate 
to apply this arsenal in the cold war which won for her 
the sympathy and friendship of many newly admitted 
members of the third world into the UN. Perceiving 
that its influence among the young independent nations 
had diminished to very low ebb, the US dramatically 
rebounced with enormous financial assistance to some 
African states in what the Soviet described as dollar 
diplomacy to win more friends to her orbit. From this 
viewpoint, the cold war was a mixed-blessing to Africa. 
Soviet posturing on the colonial question was highly 
appreciated by African leaders, and when in 1960, the 
US with the colonial powers refused to approve the 
UN resolution 1514 on colonial independence, George 
(1992), remarked that the US officially joined the colonial 
powers “as the enemies of decolonilization”, or rather, 
“colonialist-imperial exploiters”.
It is pertinent to state that even before the event of 
1960, which put the US as a collaborator with “imperial 
exploiters”, many studies commissioned by the US to 
both understand Africa as well as draw up an appropriate 
policy position, furthered and practically, imposed US-
NATO interest in Africa. Two significant references in 
this regard would be necessary here. In 1957, a US special 
mission to Africa defined America’s interest in Africa as 
follows:
An interest in the evolution of Africa in a manner not enemical 
to our democratic type of government, the exclusion of 
influences unfriendly to our way of life, the hope by having 
access to the raw materials of that continent, especially to 
safeguard our minimum strategic needs…. (Obiozor, 1992, p.10).
Equally captured by Obiozor is the Herskovit Report 
on Africa, which one of its recommendations stated thus:
US policy in furthering its own best interest and in accord with 
the action of some of our own NATO associates should be 
guided by expectation of the primacy of Africans in all Sub-
Saharan Africa
The pursuit of African policy as enunciated above 
could not be disguised. The US furthered its policy 
like an imperial power; gain political allies in the cold 
war access to oil and diamonds, naval bases to monitor 
and safeguard its politico-economic interest and so on. 
The implication of the aforementioned policy on Africa 
cannot be over emphasized. The US did go a long way to 
cause African nations to conform to its new world order. 
Some of these realist pursuits of the national interest are 
considered.
The deradicalization of social forces in Africa; 
“whether they appear as regimes, movements, parties, 
institutions or ideologically conscious groups”, with the 
intent to weaken and keep Africa from being radical. 
Angola during Augustino Neto, Mozambique in Samora 
Michel’s regime, Libya under Qhadaffi, SWAPO and the 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
The Bi-Polar World System and the Contradictions of 
African Independence: A Retrospective Reflection
182
African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa were 
all such regimes that experienced concerted assault from 
the forces of imperialism acting directly, or by proxy. The 
progressive forces, opined Ake, “offer the only hope for 
the emancipation and development of Africa—, it is they 
alone who can respond to the mobilization of Africa’s 
only viable weapon of emancipation namely the energy of 
the African masses—.” (Ihonbere, 1989, p.95)
The shoring up of reactionary or puppet regimes 
in Africa, in what Claude Ake calls “Satellization of 
Africa”, “entails propping up and bringing into existence 
submissive reactionary regimes, maintaining and 
reinforcing Africa’s exploitative dependence, shielding 
Africa against radical influences—” (Ihonvbere) even 
maintaining military presence as France in Mali and 
military bases in North Africa until the emergence 
of col. Maumar Gadaffi in 1969 expelled foreigners 
essentially of western extraction from those bases. The 
shoring up of despotic regimes in the Maghreb states of 
North Africa as a check on Libya and other interests is 
partly responsible for the explosive political upheavals 
which swept the Maghreb states from December, 
2010 in what is remembered as the Arab spring (Enor, 
2013). When the US supported free democracies, “it 
was inclined to employ the ideas on the crucial role of 
the military in modernizing new nations — if only to 
locate sympathetic anti-communist—” (Kolko, 1988, 
pp.188-189). The US preferred and supported military 
regimes in Africa as “coups were a healthy response to 
foreign alien ideologies”. In Congo, the US propped 
up Col. Mobutu Sese Seko who in turn collaborated 
with the West and became the arrow head in the hands 
of imperial forces in their destabilization processes in 
Africa. It is little wonder that vociferous sons of Africa 
with socialist leaning met their untimely sepulcre by 
the activities of subversive agencies of the West. Prime 
Ministers Nkruma (Ghana) Patrice lomumba (Congo), 
Murtala Mohammed (Nigeria) and so on, met their 
untimely death in those pitiable circumstances. To 
imagine that an African head of state could be used as 
proxy, against other independent African states tells not 
only of the lack of an ideology but the contradiction of 
African independence. Kolko noted that between 1963 
and 1968, there were as many as sixty four military 
mutinies and failed or successful coups in Africa master 
minded or so it seemed, by imperialist agencies with 
the intention to usher in “the free world economic 
doctrine and technology”. Today, the extent and degree 
to which the free economic doctrine has tackled African 
underdevelopment with the colossal losses in human 
and material resources can only be imagined. These 
more than any other factor guarantees instability and 
underdevelopment.
CONCLUSION
The naked pursuit of the national interest from realist 
viewpoint which accompanied the policy of containment 
enunciated by the US after the Second World War had 
far reaching implications for the stability, security 
and independence of African states. This situation is 
compounded by the near fact of ideological deficiency 
which has caused the continent to be vulnerable to 
international economic manipulations leading to 
dependency and internal weaknesses. The result is 
the endless political gerrymandering and economic 
squadermania in most African states. The sooner African 
statesmen recourse to the clarion call by their founding 
fathers for a pan-African unity with an inward looking 
development agenda, the healthier for the progress of the 
continent which possess some of the world’s most needed 
strategic mineral resources.
REFERENCES
Ake, C.  (1978). Revolutionary pressures in Africa. London: Zed 
Publishers.  
Asogwa, F. C, (1999). Understanding int’l relations. Enugu: 
Vougasen ltd.
Cabarl, A. (1966). The weapon of theory. Speech delivered in 
in Cuba. Retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/subject/
africa/cabral/1966/weapon-theory.htm
Enor, F., & Chime, J. (2013). Revolutionary eruption in the 
Maghreb States of North Africa: A discourse on their 
implications for United States – Africa relations. Canadian 
Journal of Politics and Law, 6(1), 163-172.
Enor, F. (2012) United states policy towards Africa since the 
Cold War. Calabar: Saesprint (Nig) Co.
Gabriel, K. (1988), Confronting the Third World U.S. foreign 
policy, 1945-1980. New York, NY: Panthem Books.
Gbenenye, E. M. (2004) An introduction to diplomacy and 
european history in the 19th and 20th centuries. Nigeria: 
Springfield Publishers Ltd.
Higgins, H. (1984) The cold war (2nd ed.). London. Heinemann 
Educational Books Ltd.
Igwe, S. C. (2010), How Africa underdeveloped Africa. Port-
Harcourt, Nigeria: Professional Publishers and Printers. 
Ihonvbere, J. (1989). (Ed). The political economy of crisis and 
underdevelopment in Africa: Selected works of Claude Ake. 
Lagos: JAD Publishers Ltd.
Obama, B. (2009). Obama’s speech in Accra, Ghana. Retrieved 
from http:// www.surgeusa.org/global/ghana/11 july/2009.
htm
Obiozor, G. (1992). An uneasy friendship: Nigeria-US relations. 
Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing co. ltd.
Ojo, O., & Sesay, A. (2002). Concepts in int’l relations. Ile-Ife: 
Clean Print Publishers.
